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Gilberto Gomes, Ph.D.*The free will problem is defined and three solutions are
discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compa-
tibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing
for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that
the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics
admits a certain degree of randomness in the determi-
nation of events. However, this is not enough for a compa-
tibilist position—which is favored here—since freedom is
not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is
argued that the core of the free will problem is what this I is.
A materialist view is favored: The I is an activity of the
brain. In addition to absence of external and internal
compulsion, freedom involves absence of causal sufficiency
of influences acting on the I. A more elaborate compatibi-
list view is proposed, according to which causal determi-
nation is complete whenwe add events occurring in the I (of
which the subject is not conscious). Contrary to what
several authors have argued, the onset of the readiness
potential before the decision to act is no problem here.
The experience of agency is incomplete and fallible, rather
than illusory. Some consequences of different views about
freedom for the ascription of responsibility are discussed.
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.The problem of free will has been an object of human concern since antiquity. In the
first section of this article, the problem is outlined and three possible solutions
(no-freedom theory, libertarianism and compatibilism) are examined. The next
section shows the importance of the concept of determinism in the evaluation of
these alternative views. A defense of compatibilism will then be presented. It will be
shown that the I is a key concept in evaluating the plausibility of compatibilism.
However, the usual view of compatibilism is vulnerable to criticisms and a more
elaborate view of this position will be proposed in the fourth section. The causal
status of the I in relation to the possibility of doing otherwise is discussed next. The
sixth section will briefly focus on freedom as an inevitable consequence of the normalomes, Ph.D., R. LopesQuintas 100-605-I, 22460-010Rio de Janeiro, RJ,
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222 G. Gomesworking of the human brain. Some data from neuroscience has been invoked as
evidence that it is not free will that initiates voluntary acts. This claim, which has
been used to favor either no-freedom theory or special forms of libertarianism, is
countered in the seventh section. Psychological experiments have also been used to
try to prove that free will is an illusion, and these are succinctly discussed in the
eighth section. The last section examines some consequences of the different
positions concerning free will for our views about responsibility.THE PROBLEM AND THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Are human beings free? Should human beings be free? A little reflection will show
that the word free is used in two different senses in these two questions. The question
of whether human beings should be free implies that they may not be free under
certain circumstances. It involves a sense of freedom that refers to external
circumstances. A dictatorship, for example, severely restricts the freedom of its
citizens, who are thus not free to do several things that they should be able to do. The
question of whether human beings are free is a question of whether they have a
certain intrinsic property, namely, the capacity to choose among the alternatives that
are available to them, in a way that is influenced, but not completely determined, by
all sorts of factors that affect them. We might call these two senses external and
internal freedom, respectively.
The problem of free will may be conceived as the problem of whether we have
internal freedom, what this internal freedom consists in, and how it relates to the
notion that all events have causes. Since it is usually believed that only agents that
have internal freedom may be considered responsible for what they do, these
questions may have significant implications for social life, moral judgments and the
legal system.
The following are three possible views concerning the problem of free will, as it
has been discussed in recent times.1. TCophere is no free will. Free will is an illusion. What a person does is determined by
what goes on in her or his brain, which is in turn determined by previous internal
and external events. The causal chain goes back to times when the person did not
yet exist, so the person cannot be held ultimately responsible for what she or he
does. Therefore, legal punishment can only have a practical justification, not a
moral one. If someone is good or bad, this is just the result of the circumstances of
her or his environment and of her or his nature. Even if the person did something
good as a result of an effort to do so, this is because she or he was lucky enough to
realize that the effort was worth making and was lucky enough to have a nature
that enabled her or him to make it. When someone wonders or ponders what she
or he will or should do, the result of this decision-making process is already
determined by her or his nature and the present circumstances. The person
simply does not know what this result will be, but she or he is not in fact free to
determine it. It is an illusion to think that what the person will do depends on her
or his decision, because, even if it does depend on a particular decision, the
decision itself is determined by prior events and not by a prior decision. There is
nothing a person can do to change the course of events, including her or his ownyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 25: 221–234 (2007)
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otherwise, if she or he had decided to do so. All a person did is what she or he had
to do, since it was determined by her or his nature and her or his circumstances at
the time of the action, which were not ultimately determined by her- or himself.2. It is an evident fact that people are free to choose what they do. There are practical
limits to human action, but whenever more than one course of action is possible,
people can choose which one they will take. Physical determinism cannot be
extended to human actions. The will causes physical events but it is not caused by
physical events. When choosing what to do, people are influenced by all sorts of
internal and external factors, but these factors do not completely cause the
decision. Even if a person’s decision is influenced (that is, partly determined) by
factors of which she or he is not conscious, there are other factors of which she or
he is conscious and, in relation to these, it is the person who chooses, at least to a
certain point, how and to what extent they will influence her or his decision.
Therefore, free will cannot be reduced to neural processes in the brain. These are
physical processes subject to causal laws. If the will were a part of these, it would
be determined, not free. Free will is something that can change the natural course
of events.3. We know that some actions are freely chosen and others are automatic reactions.
We should be able to able to characterize the difference between them. Science
has shown us that all natural phenomena are caused by other natural phenomena.
The activity of the human mind has been consistently shown to depend on the
functioning of the human brain and the latter consists of natural phenomena
involving neurons, action potentials, neurotransmitters and so on. There is no
reason to suppose that the causal chains that determine neural events are broken
at some point. However, we should not deny that free will exists, since we need
this concept to distinguish between two sorts of human action. Therefore, we
must understand free will as a part of the workings of the human brain.We should
change our concept of freedom, so as to preserve what is essential in it,
eliminating the idea that freedom must escape natural causality. An action is
free when it results from a conscious intention to start it, to continue it, or at least
not to refrain from starting or continuing it. There is no need to suppose that this
intention must not be the result of causal processes in the brain. A person is
responsible for an action when this action results from a conscious intention. To
be responsible for an action is not to be ultimately responsible for it, in the sense of
also being responsible for all the events in the causal chains that led to the
existence of the conscious intention that determined the action.
The three statements above illustrate the three main alternative positions on the
problem of free will as it is nowadays discussed. The first two of these admit that
there is an incompatibility between freedom and natural causality. Thus, they are
both incompatibilist, but they derive opposite conclusions from this incompatibility.
The first maintains that all events are causally determined and consequently there is
no free will. FollowingGalen Strawson (2004), I will call this position the ‘no-freedom
theory’. The second accepts that free will exists and consequently rejects that all
events are causally determined. This position is usually called libertarianism. Some
versions of it admit that events may be caused either by other events (natural
causality) or by agents (agent causality). However, the causing of an event by anpyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 25: 221–234 (2007)
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position admits that freedom and natural causality are compatible. It is thus called
compatibilism.
There are many versions of these three basic positions. Libertarianism may be
associated with a dualist conception, according to which physical reality and the
mind (or soul) are essentially different realities (or substances) that interact with each
other. However, there are also non-dualist versions of it, though these have difficulty
in showing that they do not really imply some form of dualism.Different authors may
draw different moral, social and legal implications from no-freedom theory, and at
least since Hobbes several different compatibilist definitions of free actions and free
will have been proposed.
The aim of this article is not to examine the different versions of the three positions
and the arguments for and against each of them. Rather, it will argue for a particular
version of compatibilism, which tries to reconcile the no-freedom theorist’s view that
human action is naturally caused with the libertarian’s claim that there are actions
that are chosen by the person rather than determined by causal factors acting on her
or him.THE CONCEPT OF DETERMINISM IN DISCUSSIONS
OF THE FREE WILL PROBLEM
In discussions of the problem of the relation between free will and universal
causality—i.e. the idea that everything that happens (including actions) is caused by
prior events—causality is often understood as strict determinism. Strict determinism
is the idea that prior conditions precisely determine every parameter—in minute
detail—of what happens. Nothing is indeterminate; there is no essential randomness
in nature. Randomness, according to this view, is just ignorance of causes. When we
toss a coin or throw a dice, a precise knowledge of the relevant parameters, together
with the laws of mechanics, would allow a precise prediction of the result. This
conception of the world was specially stimulated by classical mechanics. Here we
have the so-called universe of Laplace, who claimed that an intellect that knew all the
forces acting in the universe and the position of all its objects at a given instant would
be able to know all its past and future states (Laplace, 1825/1921).
The advent of quantum mechanics, however, has significantly changed this
picture of the world. In quantum physics, some events have only a definite
probability of occurrence—they are not strictly determined. Strict deterministic laws
apply only at the macroscopic level, not at the microscopic one. However,
microscopic events may have macroscopic effects, as chaos theory and the study of
self-organizing systems have shown (Prigogine, 2003). Therefore, events that
involve the evolution of dynamic systems far from equilibrium are not fully
predictable from prior conditions.
Even at the intuitive level, strict determinism may seem to be a strange doctrine.
On the one hand, the idea that everything is strictly determined is attractive. On the
other hand, however, consider a grain of dust that falls somewhere on a desert planet
at a certain moment: It seems bizarre to think that since the Big Bang it was
determined that precisely this grain of dust would fall exactly on this place at this very
moment! In other words, it is not only in relation to free actions that strictCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 25: 221–234 (2007)
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no agent at all. Moreover, since modern science does not say that strict determinism
exists in nature, why should we bother with the intuitive incompatibility between free
will and strict determinism?
The argument above is given here because many discussions of free will assume
strict determinism as an established property of physical events. They often imply
that any non-libertarian theory has to admit the strict determinism of human actions,
which is not true. Galen Strawson (2004), for example, states
According to compatibilists, we do have free will. They propound a sense of the word
‘free’ according to which free will is compatible with determinism, even though
determinism is the view that the history of the universe is fixed in such a way that nothing
can happen otherwise than it does because everything that happens is necessitated by
what has already gone before (p. 2).
This makes it seem as though the only option for compatibilists is to adopt strict
determinism. This is not so: Compatibilists may endorse a view of causality that
allows for a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However,
the view that nature is not strictly deterministic is not enough to offer a solution to the
problem of free will. To admit a certain degree of randomness in the determination of
an action is insufficient to characterize it as free and to admit that one’s present
nature is the result of a process of development in which many events involved a
certain degree of randomness is also of no avail to make one responsible for one’s
actions. A free action is felt to have been determined by the person who does it, not
by chance. A random event is not one for which a person would be held responsible.
Therefore, one might argue that if a person cannot be held responsible either for
chance or for prior circumstances, she or he cannot be held responsible for her or his
actions, if prior circumstances and chance are all there is to the determination of
actions.A DEFENSE OF COMPATIBILISM—HIGHLIGHTING
THE ROLE OF THE I
Libertarians feel that the person her- or himself is the essential element in the
determination of free actions—and I believe they are right in this. This leads us to
ask: What is the person her- or himself ? What is the I (or self) that decides an action,
when a person can say, ‘‘I did it because I decided to do it’’? The concept of I is an
elusive one and to say it is an indexical1 is not enough to dispel this elusiveness.
Suppose I cut my finger. I can say, ‘‘I have been hurt’’, but I can also say ‘‘My finger
has been hurt’’. It would be easy to observe thatmy finger is just a part of myself, but I
can also say, ‘‘I feel an ache in my finger’’, and in this case the I seems not to include
the finger—the finger is in some sense external to the I, since the I is what feels and
the finger is what is felt. The finger is a (bodily) part of the person that is felt by
another (mental) part of the person. Note also that we say ‘‘my finger’’ just as we say
‘‘my pen’’, as if they were both things that belong to the I, not only the pen but also
the finger is in some sense external to the I that possesses them.1An indexical is a term whose reference depends on the context of utterance. I is an indexical because it
refers to whoever is speaking.
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distinct from the body that she or he possesses, feels, and moves and in which her or
his emotions express themselves. However, one can say, ‘‘I had my reasons for doing
this’’, including feelings, ideas and plans among these reasons. So these reasons are
psychological factors that in a certain sense are in the I, but in another sense act on the
I and are in this sense external to it. The I considered these reasons, thought about
how they should be weighed, and then decided what to do. One may say that it was
not these reasons that determined the action, but the I. The I that considers the
reasons is in a certain sense distinct from them—but what is it?
I think that the core of the problem of free will is the problem of what the I that
chooses what to do is. From a strict Humean point of view, an I that is distinct from
reasons, feelings and plans simply does not exist, since Hume conceives themind as a
mere bundle of sensations, along with thoughts and intentions derivs from them. A
radical empiricist2 position recognizes no active center in the mind—the mind is
essentially passive, since it depends completely on sensation of what is external to it.
Such a viewpoint agrees well with no-freedom theory. In fact Hume defends a sort of
compatibilism. On the one hand, he holds that actions and volitions, no less than
physical events, obey a strict determinism. On the other, he grants that humans have
‘‘the power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will’’—
which is his definition of liberty. Moreover, he thinks that liberty is compatible with
determinism (Hume, 1748/2000, p. 72).
However, Hume’s compatibilism is achieved through a very restrictive view of
freedom (liberty), according to which liberty is no more than what is ‘‘allowed to
belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains’’ (Hume, 1748/2000, p. 72).
Moreover, the ‘‘will’’ mentioned in the quotation above is subsequently analyzed by
him as being nothing more than motives, inclinations and circumstances—not an
active power that evaluates these motives, inclinations and circumstances and
determines what to do. Hobbes (1654/2005, p. 273) also conceived freedom as the
mere ‘‘absence of all impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and
intrinsical quality of the agent’’. This corresponds to what I called external freedom
at the beginning of this article.
Criticisms of the compatibilist position often assume that it adopts such a
restrictive view of freedom as the absence of external restraint. Searle (2000), for
example, states
The compatibilist view is that if we properly understand these terms, freedom of the will
is completely compatible with determinism. . . . So if someone puts a gun tomy head and
tells me to raise my arm, my action is not free, but if I raise my arm by way of voting, as
we say, ‘freely’, or ‘of my own free will’, then my action is free. Though in both cases . . .
my action is completely causally determined (p. 11).
Searle goes on to argue that this sense of freedom as absence of external
constraints is irrelevant to the problem of free will. Moreover, even if we add the
absence of internal constraints such as compulsion, panic, or addiction, the critic of
compatibilism will remain unconvinced. According to Searle, we experience a gap
between the reasons for acting and the decision to act. We feel that the antecedent
causal conditions of our free actions are not causally sufficient to produce the action.2Radical empiricism is the philosophical position according to which all mental events are completely
derived from sense impressions.
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internal compulsion, but also absence of causal sufficiency of the antecedent
conditions of an action.
Consider another quotation from Searle (2000, p. 12):
A complete specification of all the psychological causes operating on me at t1, with all
their causal powers, including any psychological laws relevant to the case, would not be
sufficient to entail that I would perform act A under any description.
Note that the author uses the preposition ‘on’ when referring to the relationship
between the psychological causes and the I. The psychological causes he mentions
act on the I and are thus in a certain sense external to the I. We see that the author is
considering the I or ‘me’ as being distinct from all the psychological causes at play.
Suppose now we also take into account the psychological causes and laws operating
in me (and not only those operating on me, as Searle does). Then a complete
specification of all the psychological causes and laws acting both on me and in me
might be sufficient to entail at least a certain probability of my performing act A.
What I want to suggest is that we should adopt a more complex view of the I.
There are multiple Is, according to different aspects or moments of mental activity.
When I say that I have a certain desire, it is certainly I who desire, but when I choose
to resist this desire, it is another I that is active. The libertarian is right when she or he
says that the reasons and influences that operate on the deciding I are insufficient to
determine the action, but this leaves open the question of whether what the deciding
I actively does with these influences in order to reach a decision is itself determined
by causal factors or not.
When the libertarian says, ‘‘It is I, and not antecedent causes, that determined
what I did’’, she or he is not considering the possibility that her or his I is included in
these antecedent causes and is itself caused by previous conditions. That this may be
the case should be considered as a scientific hypothesis, not to be simply rejected on
philosophical or phenomenological grounds. Scientific facts often go against how
things appear to be.
Here the no-freedom theorist might step in and say, ‘‘But if the ‘I’ is causally
determined, then it is not free.’’ On behalf of compatibilism, I would like to counter
this objection with the argument that it all depends on how we define freedom. If we
include in the definition of freedom the requirement that free decisions to act must
not be causally determined, then compatibilism would be simply impossible. Perhaps
this is the most natural view of free will. Perhaps we tend to view free decisions to act
as emanating from the I and the I as being outside the natural sequences of causes
and effects, but the latter view may be wrong even if the former is right.A MORE ELABORATE COMPATIBILIST
VIEW OF FREE WILL
If one’s starting point is a conception of free will that includes its not being causally
determined by prior events, then any compatibilist proposal will involve the need to
change this conception. However, such a reconceptualization of free will need not be
so restrictive as to limit freedom to the absence of external constraint (external
freedom), as critics of compatibilism usually imply. A more elaborate compatibilistCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 25: 221–234 (2007)
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acting on the deciding subject do not completely determine her or his actions
(Hodgson, 2005). I believe that a compatibilist conception may preserve all that is
essential in the everyday notion of free will, namely (1) the idea that in free action the
person her- or himself, as a psychological subject, chooses what to do, (2) the idea
that freedom depends on consciousness and, more specifically, that a free action
results from a conscious intention, and (3) the idea that freedom implies the
possibility of doing otherwise. Let us examine these three points.1. TCophe idea that it is the person that chooses what to do is fully consistent with
natural causality, if we adopt the ‘‘astonishing hypothesis’’, as Crick (1994) calls
it, that all our personhood and psychical life is given by the activity of our brains.
The working brain, with literally billions of synaptic contacts among its neurons,
is such a wonderfully differentiated and complex system that it has been
increasingly considered reasonable to admit that all our mental life corresponds
to its activity. Accordingly, the brain processes of considering alternative courses
of action and choosing what to do are also to be regarded as subject to natural
causality.2. Consciousness (including conscious intentions) may also be considered as a
property of complex neural activity (as argued, for example, by Gomes, 1995).3. The possibility of doing otherwise has often been judged to be one of the
hallmarks of free action. One has done something of one’s own free will when
one could also have done otherwise. Searle (2000), for example, states
Granted that the action did occur, and that it did occur for a reason, all the same, the
agent could have done something else, given the same causal antecedents of the action
(p. 11).
We have already seen that in such a line of reasoning the agent her- or himself is
not included among the causal antecedents that are being considered. Compati-
bilism can grant that, given the same causal antecedents other than the agent’s activity
of deciding what to do, she or he could have done something else. Now this activity of
deciding what to do need not be viewed as something outside the realm of natural
events. It may also be a natural event that is the result of causal conditions. This
naturalistic conception does not eliminate the possibility of doing otherwise.
What do people (including philosophers) mean when they say that someone could
have done otherwise? They surely do not merely mean that the person concerned
might have done something different from what she or he did, if circumstances had
been different from what they were. Any event—not just free actions—might have
been different from what it was if its causes had been different. What they mean is
that the person concerned had the power to do otherwise even if circumstances had
been the same. If the person had that power, it would have been possible for her or
him to do something else in the presence of the same causal factors acting on her or
him. This means that what the person did was not completely determined by these
causal factors. But again, the circumstances imagined to be the same do not include
the person’s very process of deciding what to do. (The theme of the possibility of
doing otherwise is further developed in the next section.)
In a nutshell, according to this more elaborate version of compatibilism, a free
action is at the same time (1) free of complete determination by conditions externalyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 25: 221–234 (2007)
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causally determined by conditions internal to this deciding system.THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING OTHERWISE
An action is free (or is determined by free will) if the person who did it could have
done otherwise, even if all the causal factors acting on her or him had been the same.
The emphasis on the role of the I in the discussion above should in no way be
considered as an alternative to this traditional way of characterizing free will. The
presence of an I is not sufficient for an action to be free. An action may be due to a
pathological compulsion, for example. Such an unfree action may be said to be a
manifestation of a person’s I, since the word I, as discussed above, may be used to
refer the whole of a person or to different physical or mental subsets of her or him.
The point in highlighting the role of the I is that the concept of an I is implicitly
present in the traditional conception of free will as involving the possibility of doing
otherwise.
In order to see this, it is necessary to articulate what is implicit in the usual
formulation of this conception. People usually simply say that an action is free if the
person could have done otherwise. However, this is patently not enough. As pointed
out above, it is implicit that this must have been so even if the circumstances had been
the same, but this is still insufficient. If someone argues that a person could have done
otherwise in the same circumstances if she or he had had different desires or different
beliefs, the advocate of free will not agree. The idea of free will seems to imply that a
person could have done otherwise in the same circumstances even if she or he had had
the same desires and beliefs. Onemight say, ‘‘My desires and beliefs have influencedmy
decision, but they have not determined it. I considered these desires and beliefs and I
decided what to do. I could have done otherwise, even if I had had the same desires
and beliefs.’’
We thus find that the I is an essential element in the idea of the possibility of doing
otherwise. In the reasoning above, as argued in the third section, the desires and
beliefs seem to be inside the person, but still outside the deciding system in her or his
mind—referred to as her or his I. When one says, ‘‘I consideredmy desires and beliefs
. . .’’, one is speaking about an active instance in one’s mind that exists in addition to
her or his desires and beliefs and is able to do something with them. The fundamental
question then is how to conceive this I. We tend to view this I as lying outside the
realm of physical causes and effects, but is this really so?My compatibilist proposal is
that we should view it as a system in the brain. We can then keep the idea that this
system could have chosen to act otherwise, even if all the circumstances, beliefs, and
desires that it was considering had been the same. However, it is not logically
possible that it could have chosen to act otherwise if everything that occurred in it had
been the same, since the choice of an action is a direct result of what occurs in it.NOT FREE NOT TO BE FREE
Sartre (1943, pp. 168, 494) provocatively stated that man is condemned to be free. A
person is free to choose no longer to live (by committing suicide), but one is not freeCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 25: 221–234 (2007)
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to have the capacity to determine by themselves which available course of action to
take and it is not in their power to give up this capacity.
From the point of view of neuroscience, this may be taken as meaning that the
human brain is naturally endowed with an ability to consider different possibilities of
action and to choose one of them. Moreover, this ability seems to be essential to
personal identity, since there is a sense that the same self is the agent of different
instances of deciding what to do, in a person’s life. Thus, the identity of a person,
both to her- or himself and to others, is intimately bound with this unavoidable
ability to act freely and the innumerable instances in which it is used.NEURAL PROCESSES INVOLVED IN VOLITION AND
THEIR IMPORT FOR THE FREE WILL PROBLEM
Many have interpreted the results of Libet’s experiments on the timing of the
conscious decision to act (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983a; Libet, Wright, &
Gleason, 1983b) as evidence that free will is an illusion (Wegner, 2002), or at least
that it is ineffective as regards the initiation of free acts (Libet, 1985, 1987). These
experiments involve the readiness potential discovered by Kornhuber and Deecke
(1965). The readiness potential is obtained by averaging a certain number of
electroencephalographic (EEG) tracings: A slow negative potential appears mainly
over the motor cortex half a second or more before a voluntary movement is
performed. The movement is previously defined by the experimenter, but the
moment of making it is determined by the subject, who is instructed to perform it
immediately after the decision.
The interval between the onset of the readiness potential (RP) and the movement
is influenced by the instructions given. It may be longer than a whole second. Libet,
Wright and Gleason (1982) were able to obtain shorter RPs with instructions that
favored spontaneity. However, the RPs still preceded the movement by at least
200 milliseconds (ms) and typically by about 600ms.3 This seems to be long in
relation to the experienced time between the decision to move and the movement.
The correct conclusion to be drawn from this is that the conscious decision to act
occurs after the onset of the RP.However, the relatively long interval between the RP
onset and the movement has often led to a less parsimonious conclusion that may be
stated in the following terms: ‘‘The brain initiates the neural events that produce the
movement before the mind decides to make the samemovement. Consequently, it is
the brain and not the mind that initiates the movement. Neural events occurring
before a conscious decision cannot have been determined by this decision. They are
determined by prior neural events. Therefore, they are not determined by free will.
The subject feels that the moment of moving was freely chosen by her- or himself,
but in fact it was determined by events that preceded the conscious decision.’’
This kind of conclusion is coherent if we adopt a dualist view of the relation
between mind and brain. The RP poses a serious problem for those who think that
free will is an attribute of an immaterial mind that is not subject to natural causality.
Eccles, a distinguished neurophysiologist who advocated such a view, devised an3For a thorough discussion of the data, see Gomes, 1998.
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between the onset of the RP and the conscious decision tomove (Eccles, 1985). This
hypothesis really offers a solution to the problem, but there is no evidence to support
it (Gomes, 2005).
For a monist4 view of the mind as the complex activity of the brain and a
compatibilist view of free will, however, no such problem exists and no conclusion
such as that stated above is justified. The conscious decision to make the movement
at a certain moment is also a neural event that is caused by prior neural events. There
is no sense in saying that it is the brain and not the mind that initiates the movement,
since the mind is an activity of the brain (Bunge, 1979). The fact that the decision is
free means that it was determined by the person’s conscious I or self and that this
conscious I could have chosen another moment to make the movement. However,
since the conscious I is a neural system in the brain, there is no incompatibility
between this decision being free and the fact that it was preceded by certain
observable neural events (manifest in the initial part of the RP). Thesemay be seen as
a part of the workings of this neural I (Gomes, 1999).
There is no reason to suppose that the conscious decision to immediately make
the movement arises out of nothing. That the subject is not conscious of its causes is
no reason to suppose that it has no causes. Moreover, to suppose that it has causes is
no reason to suppose that it is not free, as argued in the defense of compatibilism
given above.
This sort of confusion is apparent in the work of authors who are not themselves
dualists concerning the mind–brain relation. Haggard (in Haggard & Libet, 2001,
p. 50), for example, states that ‘‘[t]emporal precedence may be important for the
controversy between mind-to-brain vs brain-to-mind causation’’—but this is true
only from a dualist perspective. And again: ‘‘the long gap between RP onset and [the
awareness of the decision to move . . .] justifies a brain–mind rather than a
mind–brain direction of causation’’ (p. 53). He continues: ‘‘The free will theorist
could suggest that conscious intentions cause the brain processes of movement
selection . . .’’. But the compatibilist free will theorist could suggest that conscious
intentions are brain processes that cause these other brain processes of movement
selection and are caused by still other brain processes that precede them. To speak of
mind-to-brain or brain-to-mind causation implicitly involves a dualist view of the
mind–brain relation.
In sum, from a monist and compatibilist perspective, the fact that a conscious
decision is caused by (other) neural events is no reason to believe that voluntary acts
are not initiated by free will.PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AGAINST FREE WILL?
A different kind of evidence was presented byWegner (2002) as supporting the view
that free will is an illusion. In one of his experiments, subjects see someone else’s
arms in amirror, in a position that makes them look like the subject’s own arms. After
hearing a command to make a certain movement, they see the hands in the mirror4Concerning the mind–brain relation, dualism is the view that mental events and physical events are
essentially different realities, while (materialist) monism is the view that mental events are brain events.
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the movement. Wegner argues that thoughts and actions alike are unconsciously
caused. When the conscious thought of an action precedes consciousness of such an
action, the subject infers that the thought caused the action, but this is an illusion:
Both were unconsciously caused (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).
Nahmias (2005) has adequately discussed the conceptual confusions present in
Wegner’s theory. The conditions identified by Wegner for producing the experience
of agency are not sufficient: Subjects report a slightly enhanced feeling of control but
they do not really think they have made the movement. Neither do they seem to be
necessary, since no specific thought of the action precedes highly automatic fast
actions such as occur in sport or musical performance, but these are still felt by the
subject to have been made by her- or himself. Furthermore, the fact that the
experience of agency is not infallible, particularly in pathological conditions, does
not imply that it is systematically illusory. As Nahmias (2005, p. 777) remarks, ‘‘here
it is more appropriate to describe our experiences as incomplete rather than illusory’’.FREE WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY
What are the consequences of different views about free will for the ascription of
responsibility or guilt for one’s actions and for the justification of punishment?
Libertarian incompatibilists tend to exaggerate the autonomy of the subject in the
determination of her or his actions. As they think that choices are made by the self
without being causally determined, they view the self as the ultimate and absolute
originator of free actions. One’s actions emanate from one’s self, and though the self
may change, it alone is the originator of any such change. Even if there was external
influence on the determination of an action or of a change in the self’s character, it is
the self that decided to accept this influence and this decision has not been caused.
The idea of self-origination that is present in such a conception is hardly intelligible,
as Nietzsche (1886/1973) has eloquently contended. A may be the origin of B, but
what is the meaning of saying that A is the origin of A?
Libertarians allow, of course, that the self may not be free in certain cases. Mental
illness is one of them. Young age is another. They usually think that what one does in
these cases cannot be considered as having been freely chosen by the self, and
consequently one is not responsible for one’s actions. The problem is that the
libertarian conception of an absolute free will favors an all-or-nothing contrast
between free and unfree actions. Within this view, it is difficult to conceive of
gradations or transitions regarding the ability to choose freely. It seems that a free
action’s escape from causality is either present or absent. We obtain a black and
white description with no shades of gray. However, there is a smooth transition from
childhood to adolescence to adulthood. Pathological compulsions also vary in degree
and this suggests a correlative variation in the degree of free will.
No-freedom theorists often question the existence of moral responsibility and the
justification of punishment on moral and not only practical grounds. They reason
that if actions are determined by causes, then the subject is not responsible for them.
This leaves us with an incomprehensible picture of the human world, since there is
no responsibility or moral obligation in it. If one could not have done otherwise, it
cannot be the case that one ought to have done otherwise (Howard-Snyder, 2006).Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 25: 221–234 (2007)
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for what she or he did, and others in which we consider her or him not responsible for
it. It cannot be that the difference between them is merely that we are victims of an
illusion regarding the former and we are not victims of such an illusion regarding the
latter.
No-freedom theorists often justify punishment on a mere utilitarian basis.
Although a person is never responsible for what she or he did, they argue, there are
cases in which punishment is useful to avoid future unhappiness, and others in which
it is useless. Punishment is justified regarding the former. However, why should the
presence or absence of an illusion in the observer make a difference in the usefulness
of punishment of the person who made the action? The no-freedom theorist may
answer that what really makes a difference is the presence or absence of a certain
attribute in the agent, just before the action, and that the presence or absence of this
attribute correlates with the presence or absence of the illusory attribution of
responsibility by the observer (which may be someone else or the agent her- or
himself). When this attribute is present in the agent, punishment shows itself to be
useful and observers tend to have the illusion that the agent was responsible for the
action. This is to say that, even though the agent is not responsible, there is
something about her or him, in certain cases, that makes punishment useful.
The definition of just what this attribute is may be problematic, but the
no-freedom theorist will not allow that it may be called responsibility, since she or he
has already concluded that responsibility does not exist. I believe it is much more
reasonable to define responsibility as being precisely this attribute, whatever it may
turn out to be and however difficult it may be to ascertain it. If the word responsibility
is so defined that it cannot be a property of the agent, but at the same time there is a
property of the agent that is relevant both for what people think and for the
usefulness of punishment, then the word should be redefined so as to refer precisely to
this property.
A change in the definition of responsibility used by certain authors is precisely what
compatibilism requires and supports. Someone need not be the ultimate originator
of an action, in the sense of being an uncaused cause or ‘‘prime mover unmoved’’
(Chisholm, 1982), to be responsible for it. An action is free, and the agent
responsible for it, when it results from a conscious decision-making process and the
agent could have done otherwise if she or he had decided to do so. The fact that the
person’s decision-making process must have had causes and that a different decision
could only have beenmade if a different set of such causes were present should not be
considered as removing her or his responsibility. A person is responsible for an action
when her or his I was in control of the process of deciding to make this action.
According to the compatibilist view I am defending, actions are free and the
person is responsible for them when they derive from the person’s I and this I could
have chosen to do otherwise, but this I is not an abstract or supernatural entity
outside the realm of natural causality. The I is a self-organizing and self-steering
system (van Duijn & Bem, 2005) within a brain. It is not a merely passive reflection
of external influences. It has individuality (personality) and consistency over time,
though it is subject to change. Change in the I’s character is usually slow, but in
exceptional cases (including those of religious conversion) a large change may occur
at a particular moment or over a short period of time. Moreover, decisions are not
made by an impartial and purely rational decision-making system, but rather by aCopyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 25: 221–234 (2007)
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account for the causal factors that may act in the I without the person being
conscious of them. Such a psychological or neuroscientific explanation, however,
does not deprive a person of her or his responsibility for actions that have been
chosen by her- or himself from among more than one alternative.REFERENCES
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